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Abstract 
This study examines whether the trade-off between real and accrual-based management 
strategies differs between firms with and without political connections. We argue that 
politically-connected firms are more likely to substitute real earnings management for accrual-
based earnings management than non-connected firms. Although real earnings management is 
more costly, we expect that politically connected firms prefer this strategy because of its 
higher secrecy and potential to mask political favors. Using a unique panel data set of 5,493 
publicly traded firms in 30 countries, our results show that politically-connected firms are 
more likely to substitute real earnings management strategies for accrual-based earnings 
management strategies than non-connected firms. We also find that when public monitoring 
and therefore the risk of detection increases, politically connected firms are more likely to 
resort to less detectable real earnings management strategies. Our finding that political 
connections play a significant role in the choice between accrual-based and real earnings 
management strategies suggests that a focus only on accrual-based measurements 
underestimates the total earnings management activities of politically-connected firms.  
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Introduction 
This study examines the relation between the political connections of firms and their choices 
for earnings management strategies in an international setting. Firms can use multiple earnings 
management strategies to manage their earnings, i.e., accrual-based and real earnings 
management (e.g. Badertscher, 2011). Accrual-based earnings management aims to obscure 
true economic performance by changing accounting methods or estimates within the generally 
accepted accounting principles (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). On the contrary, real earnings 
management alters the execution of real business transactions (Roychowdhury, 2006). By 
adapting the timing or structuring of real transactions, firms change their operating activities to 
meet or beat short-term earnings targets, which has direct cash flow consequences and also 
potential long-term consequences for their economic value. For these reasons, real earnings 
management strategies are considered to be relatively costly compared to accrual-based 
earnings management (Graham et al., 2005). The advantage of real earnings management is, 
however, that it is more difficult to detect than accrual-based earnings management (Graham 
et al., 2005; Gunny, 2010; Badertscher, 2011). Prior studies have shown evidence that firms 
use the two earnings management strategies as substitutes in managing earnings (Cohen et al. 
2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012). This study extends research 
on the trade-off between real and accrual-based management by examining whether the 
substitution of real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management strategies 
differs between firms with and without political connections. We argue that politically-
connected firms favor the relatively more costly real earnings management strategies because 
of its higher secrecy and are more likely to substitute relatively more costly and less detectable 
real earnings management strategies for accrual-based earnings management strategies than 
non-connected firms. 
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Firms have political connections if their controlling shareholders or top managers are 
members of national parliaments or governments or have close connections with a top 
politician or party (Faccio, 2006). Literature shows that politically-connected firms have 
opportunities to gain a lot from their political connections (Faccio, 2010; Pastor and Veronesi, 
2013).
2
 However, they are also under higher public scrutiny and subject to more extensive 
controls and public monitoring than non-connected firms (Chaney, Faccio and Parsley, 2011). 
As a consequence, the gains from their connections may need to be hidden, particularly if they 
are large and of dubious legality (Fisman, 2001). The costs they face when the media and other 
political parties detect that a firm manages its earnings to mask private gains may wipe out the 
benefits from their connections (Faccio, 2006). After all, detection may damage the firm’s 
reputation integrity, as well the connected politicians’ reputations, and increase political costs 
and the likelihood of outside intervention (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Faccio, 2006; 
Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 2011; Kothari et al., 2012). Additionally, connected firms may 
lose their privileged access to benefits from their political connections. For these reasons, we 
expect that politically-connected firms are more likely to substitute real earnings management 
for accrual-based earnings management strategies than non-connected firms. In particular 
when public monitoring is high, they are more likely to resort to the more costly real earnings 
management strategies than non-connected firms. Real earnings management helps politically-
                                                          
2
 Political connections may positively influence the allocation of capital and business opportunities to 
connected firms, resulting in competitive advantage over other companies which are not connected 
(Fisman, 2001). For example, politically-connected firms get easier access to debt financing and lower 
taxation (e.g. Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Claessens et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010; 
Goldman et al., 2013), have preferential access to government contracts (Goldman et al., 2009), or have 
benefits from regulatory protection (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998) and bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006). 
Due to connected politicians’ close involvement with legislative processes, managers of connected 
firms might also have superior information about which industries or firms are supported or harmed by 
intended government intervention, which helps them to overcome the political uncertainties in advance 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Ziobrowski et al., 2004; Pastor and Veronesi, 2013). In addition, the 
connections with firms also help the politicians to get benefits from supporting these firms or (as 
shareholder) to increase their financial wealth, for example, by exploiting insider information of the 
firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Goldman et al., 2009). 
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connected firms more effectively than accrual-based earnings management to take advantage 
of not being detected and to maintain their own and the firm’s reputation in the short run at the 
cost of firm’s long term performance (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005; Graham et al., 2005; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
Using a unique panel data set of 5,493 publicly traded firms in 30 countries, our results 
show that, compared to non-connected firms, politically-connected firms are more likely to 
substitute relatively more costly and less detectable real earnings management strategies for 
accrual-based earnings management strategies, after controlling for other incentives for 
earnings management. Particularly when politically-connected firms are established in 
countries with relatively high levels of public monitoring, they use relatively more real 
earnings management strategies. Results from additional analysis also show that firms with 
political connections engage more in real activities manipulation than non-connected firms 
after controlling for other incentives for earnings management. The findings of additional 
analyses show that the results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of countries with a very 
large number of observations or with only a few observations and to different measures of 
earnings management and public monitoring.  
This paper contributes to the ongoing research related to earnings management in three 
ways. First, we add to the extant earnings management literature that considers both real and 
accrual-based earnings management as substitutes in managing earnings (Ewert and 
Wagenhofer, 2005; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). Studies show that firms switch 
from one type of earnings management to another after new legislation, e.g., the passage of 
SOX (Cohen et al., 2008), or around seasoned equity offerings (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010), 
and evidence that firms trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based 
earnings management based on their relative costliness (Zang, 2012). Our results add to this 
literature by showing that the tendency of firms to trade-off accrual-based versus real earnings 
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management also varies with the presence of specific firm characteristics, i.e., the existence of 
political connections. Second, it complements a growing body of international literature on 
political connections. Recent studies that examine the differences in earnings management 
between politically-connected and non-connected firms, report that the presence of political 
connections is associated with a lower accruals quality (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Chaney et al., 
2011; Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 2010). The current evidence is on accrual-based earnings 
management and therefore neglects the potentially more hazardous effects of real earnings 
management. This study extends the literature on the relationship between political 
connections of firms and earnings management by investigating whether the trade-off between 
real and accrual-based management differs between firms with and without political 
connections. We show that companies’ political connections play a significant incremental 
role in explaining variance in the trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings 
management strategies. Our results also indicate that, at least for politically connected firms, if 
firms use accrual-based and real earnings management strategies as substitutes, studying only 
the former is likely to underestimate their total earnings management activities. Finally, it 
complements literature on the role of public monitoring and governance by showing that the 
politically-connected firms that are established in countries with relatively high (low) levels of 
public monitoring are more (less) likely to substitute real earnings management for accrual-
based earnings management to hide the gains that they typically derive from their political 
connections.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First, we present a review of the 
related literature and develop hypotheses on the associations between firms’ political 
connections and their use of real and/ or accrual earnings management strategies associated 
with reporting earnings. This is followed by the research method, the results and robustness 
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tests. Third, we draw conclusions, discuss the limitations of our study and indicate directions 
for further research. 
 
2. Literature review and Development of Hypotheses 
Firms can use multiple earnings management strategies, i.e., accrual-based and real 
earnings management, to manage their earnings (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Dechow et al., 
2010; Badertscher, 2011; Kothari et al., 2012). Accrual-based earnings management occurs 
when managers can choose accounting policies from a set of generally accepted policies to 
achieve earnings objectives. Real earnings management occurs when managers undertake 
actions that change the timing or structuring of operations and deviate from normal business 
practices, like manipulating sales, reducing discretionary expenditures and overproducing 
inventory to decrease the costs of goods sold, undertaken with the primary objective of 
meeting or beating certain earnings thresholds (Roychowdhury, 2006). Real earnings 
management is considered to be more expensive than accrual-based earnings management 
(Graham et al., 2005; Kim and Sohn, 2013). Unlike accrual-based earnings mangement, it has 
direct cash flow consequences which may also have a detrimental economic impact on a firm’s 
long-term value (Gunny, 2010). On the other hand, real earnings management is more difficult 
to detect than accrual-based earnings management because the real earnings management 
activities directly affect cash flows. In addition, real activities manipulation is normally not 
under the jurisdiction of any existing auditing system and less subject to extensive controls and 
external monitoring by society, including scrutiny by the media and other political parties 
(Kim and Sohn, 2013). Real earnings management can be applied throughout the year, while 
accruals earnings management is generally more constraint to specific times and periods (Zang, 
2012).  
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Darrough and Rangan (2005) and Mizik and Jacobson (2008) argue that greatest effect 
of accrual-based and real earnings management would be attained through a coordinated use of 
both tools. Managers of firms are aware of the rewards of meeting or beating earnings target 
which motivates them to choose among the alternatives earnings management strategies 
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Bartov et al., 2002). In situations where both earnings 
management methods are likely to be used, the literature provides evidence that managers 
trade-off between two earnings management strategies based on their relative costs and 
benefits, using accrual-based and real earnings management as substitutes (Ewert and 
Wagenhofer, 2005; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). Managers of 
politically-connected and non-connected firms may use both accrual-based and real earnings 
management to enhance corporate value as long as the marginal benefits outweigh the 
marginal costs. Politically-connected firms, however, are more inclined to use earnings 
management strategies to hide or obscure reporting the gains that they typically derive from 
their connections, especially those of dubious legality (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Faccio, 
2006; Faccio et al., 2006; Chaney et al., 2011). Detection may damage the reputation of the 
firm and its managers, as well as the social image of a connected political party or politician. 
In addition, detection may result in opportunity costs when the firms lose their privileged 
access to benefits from their political connections (Hay and Shleifer, 1998; Burton et al., 2011). 
For these reasons, for firms with political connections accrual-based earnings management 
strategies may be more costly than real activities manipulation if managing earnings is risky. 
Real earnings management strategies help them to mask political favors and offer connected 
firms the relative advantage of high opacity with a lower likelihood of detection (Faccio, 2006; 
Faccio et al., 2006; Chaney et al., 2011). Substitution of real earnings management for accrual-
based earnings management weakens the monitoring ability of society, maintains the 
reputation of politically-connected firms, and reduces their political costs and the likelihood of 
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outside intervention (Kothari et al., 2012; Li et al., 2013). The substitution of real earnings 
management for accrual-based earnings management decreases the risks that managers are 
taking when they manage their earnings (Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et 
al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Moreover, for connected firms, the marginal benefits of 
the secrecy of real earnings management are likely to outweigh the marginal costs, compared 
with accrual-based earnings management strategies and including the opportunity costs related 
to the deterioration of the firm's future performance after applying real earnings management. 
For these reasons we expect that politically-connected firms are more likely to substitute 
relatively costly but less detectable real activities manipulation for accrual-based earnings 
management than similar, but non-connected firms. 
 
H1: Other things being equal, politically-connected firms are more likely to substitute real 
earnings management for accrual-based earnings management than non-connected firms.  
 
Aside from the incentives and opportunities of politically-connected firms to manage 
their earnings, culture and institutional determinants of a country have been shown to 
influence the choice of accrual-based and real earnings management strategies (Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Isidro and Raonic, 2012; Houqe et al., 2012; Zang, 2012). An 
institutional factor that has a strong influence on transparency and the potential disclosure of 
hidden information and activities is public monitoring. Heightened public monitoring, 
including scrutiny by the media and other political parties (Chaney et al, 2011; Kothari et al., 
2012), increases the risk of disclosure and criticism by media and opponent political parties for 
receiving favorable treatment from politicians for any of their firm activities (Ball and 
Shivkumar, 2008). The costs can be high if press detects that a firm with political connections 
is secretly treated favorably, for example, that politicians used their influence to preferentially 
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help a connected firm out of financial difficulty (Faccio et al., 2006). If public monitoring is 
strong and politically-connected firms prefer to hide their earnings management, it is more 
risky to use accrual-based earnings management strategies that are more easily detected 
(Matsuura, 2008). As many gains from political connections may be of dubious legality, we 
expect that managers of politically-connected firms substitute real earnings management 
strategies for accrual-based earnings management particularly in countries with high public 
monitoring, in order to conceal the private gains that they derive from their political 
connections. 
 
H2: Other things being equal, politically-connected firms domiciled in countries that have a 
higher (lower) level of public monitoring are more (less) likely to substitute real earnings 
management for accrual-based earnings management.  
 
3. Research method 
3.1. Data 
To test the above hypotheses, we used the firms included in the study of Faccio (2006) as a 
starting point. This database includes 20,202 publicly traded firms in 47 countries during the 
years 1997–2001, comprising 607 political connections of 541 firms. A firm is identified as 
being connected with a politician if “at least one of its large shareholders (anyone controlling 
at least 10 percent of voting shares) or one of its top officers (CEO, president, vice-president, 
chairman, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister, or closely related to a top 
politician or party” (Faccio, 2006, p. 370).3 Consistent with Chaney et al. (2011), we excluded 
firms that are located in countries that have not a single political connection, because these 
data may bias the results. For the remaining firms to be included in our sample, we required 
                                                          
3 We thank Mara Faccio for kindly providing us with the data set. 
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that all financial and non-financial information are available. This information was extracted 
from the Worldscope Database that contains historical financial data from annual reports of 
publicly traded companies around the world. After omitting missing observations, our 
remaining unbalanced panel dataset includes data for 5,493 sample firms in 30 countries 
comprising 17,664 firm-year observations. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these 5,493 sample firms, consisting of 457 
connected firms and 5,036 non-connected peers. Panel A shows the country distribution of the 
sample firms with and without political connections in total. The number of firms with 
political connects varies considerably. For instance, in Singapore 80% of the firms selected is 
politically-connected, while in the USA less than 0.4% of the firms have political connections. 
Panel B presents the distribution of all firms with and without political connections from 1997 
to 2001. Consistent with Faccio (2006 and 2010), both Panel A and B show that the percentage 
of politically-connected firms varies considerably between countries. The sample consists of 
relatively many firms from the UK, the U.S. and Japan, while some country samples are very 
small, containing two to five firms.
4
 Panel C shows the distribution of sample firms across 
industry and size, and Panel D presents the distribution across year and industry. Among the 
industry groups, manufacturing is well represented with 9,767 observations (55%) and services 
with 5,496 observations (31%), while mining, transportation and public utilities, trade and 
finance, insurance & real estate represent respectively 5%, 3%, 1% and 4% of the observations.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3.2 Measurement of variables 
3.2.1 Measurement of real earnings management 
                                                          
4 In the robustness section, we investigate to what extent the cross-country variation – and the risk of 
self-selection bias – may affect the results. The results of the robustness tests show that the findings are 
robust to the inclusion or exclusion of specific countries. 
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Our dependent variables proxy for real earnings management. Managers can utilize one or 
multiple real earnings management strategies. Following prior literature (Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012), we used three 
proxies for real earnings management. In order to capture the aggregate effects of real earnings 
management, we also computed variables that combine the individual real earnings 
management variables. Next, we describe the measurement of these variables. 
 Following Roychowdhury (2006), we used the following three proxies for real earnings 
management:  
– abnormal levels of cash flow from operations (RM_CFO), which is generated as a result of 
acceleration of the timing of sales through increased prices discounts or more lenient credit 
terms; 
– abnormal levels of production costs (RM_PROD), which occur through overproduction of 
inventory, resulting in a lower fixed cost per unit sold and a reduction of cost of goods sold; 
– abnormal levels of discretionary expenses (RM_DISX), which is generated as a result of 
cutting discretionary expenses such as advertising, research and development and 
administrative (SG&A) expenses. 
The Appendix provides an overview of the metrics used to proxy for abnormal levels of cash 
flow from operations, production costs and discretionary expenses (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Subsequent studies using the same metrics provide further evidence of the construct validity of 
these proxies, i.e. that these measures capture real activities manipulation (Cohen et al., 2008; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012).  
 Given sales levels, firms that engage in real earnings management exhibit one or more 
of the following characteristics: abnormally low cash flows from operations, and/or 
abnormally high production costs, and/or abnormally low discretionary expenses. In order to 
capture the aggregate effects of real earnings management, we also combined the three 
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individual real earnings management measures to compute three comprehensive metrics of real 
activities manipulation. For our first measure, consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010), we 
first multiplied the standardized variables of abnormal cash flows from operations (RM_CFO) 
and abnormal discretionary expenses (RM_DISX) by negative one (so that the higher the 
amounts, the more likely it is that the firm is engaged in sales manipulation and cutting 
discretionary expenses), and then aggregated them into one measure (RM_CD). For our 
second measure, consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012), we added the 
standardized variable of abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by negative one to the 
standardized variable of abnormal production costs (RM_PROD). The higher the amount of 
this aggregate measure, the more likely the firm is engaged in cutting discretionary expenses 
and production manipulation. For our third measure, consistent with Cohen et al. (2008), we 
computed the sum of the standardized variables of abnormal cash flows from operations and 
abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by negative one and the standardized variable of 
abnormal production costs (RM_CPD). The higher the amount of this aggregate measure, the 
more likely the firm is engaged in real activities manipulation. 
 In addition, we computed two dummy variables to assess a firm’s use of real earnings 
management in combination with of accrual-based earnings management strategies. These 
variables will help us to identify which type of earnings management strategy is preferred by 
firm with (and without) political connections. The dummy variable RM_DUMMYit captures 
the type of real earnings management in aggregate: we coded a dummy if the abnormal levels 
of production costs (RM_PROD) and the reversed scores for the abnormal level of cash flow 
from operation (RM_CFO) and the abnormal level of discretionary expenses (RM_DISX). 
RM_DUMMYit of firm i in year t were above the industry-year median, and 0 otherwise. A 
value of 1 indicates that a firm is more likely to be engaged in any kind of real earnings 
management activities than the lower half of the sample. The dummy variable AM_DUMMYit 
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captures the effects of accrual-based earnings management through two measures of 
discretionary accruals that will be described in the next section. The variable AM_DUMMYit 
is equal to 1 if both proxies for accrual-based earnings management of firm i in year t are both 
above the industry-year median, and 0 otherwise. Consistent with prior literature we used the 
median as discriminating threshold (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). A 
practical justification for the use of this cut-off point is that it splits the sample in two groups 
of equal size. This eliminates potential small sample and selection biases which may occur 
when, for example, the average is used as a cut-off point.
5
 Next, we developed two composite 
measures to assess a firm’s use of diametrically opposing combinations of accrual-based and 
real earnings management strategies, which may be an indication for a substitution of real 
earnings management for accrual-based earnings management. RMHigh&AMLow is a dummy 
coded as 1 if RM_ DUMMYit is 1 and ACC_ DUMMYit is zero for firm i in year t, and zero 
otherwise, indicating firms that choose for a combination of relatively high levels of real 
earnings management (RMHigh) combined with low levels of accrual-based earnings 
management (AMLow). RMLow&AMHigh is a dummy that indicates firms with the opposite 
combination of earnings management strategies, i.e., high levels of accrual-based earnings 
management (AM_DUMMYit is 1) and low levels of real earnings management (RM_ 
DUMMYit is zero). 
 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
                                                          
5 In the robustness section, we also use alternative cut-off points to check if the cut-off at median may 
have driven our results, i.e., we repeat our analyses using the top 25% and 10% of the sample. The 
results of the additional tests show that segmentation of firms with and without earnings management 
at different levels do not change our results qualitatively, suggesting that the results are robust to 
different cut-off levels. 
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We used accrual-based earnings management, political connectedness and a country’s level of 
public monitoring as independent variables. Following prior literature, we used two 
estimations of discretionary accruals to proxy accrual-based earnings management: 
– a measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the cross-sectional Jones model 
(DA) (Dechow et al., 1995; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010); 
– the performance-adjusted measure of discretionary current accruals (REDCA) (Chaney et 
al., 2011), which is based on the method used in Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and controls for 
firm performance (Kothari et al., 2005). 
The Appendix provides an overview of the metrics used by to proxy for accrual-based 
earnings management. In addition, we computed a composite metric of accrual-based earnings 
management (AM) as the sum of the standardized variables of the two individual measures of 
accrual-based earnings management and divided them by two. 
 The measure of political connectedness is taken from Faccio (2006). We created a 
dummy variable CONNECT taking the value of 1 if a firm is politically-connected and a value 
of 0 if a firm is not connected at some point between 1997 and 2001. A company is defined as 
politically-connected if “at least one of its large shareholders (anyone controlling at least 10 
percent of the voting shares) or one of its top officers (CEO, president, vice-president, 
chairman, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister or the head of state, or is closely 
related to a top politician or party” (Faccio, 2006, p. 370 and 2010, p. 907). 
To assess a country’s level of public monitoring, we used the variable 
PRESS_FREEDOM which is based on press freedom index used by Faccio (2006). The press 
freedom index measures the extent of freedom that journalists and the media have in each 
country and the efforts made by government to ensure this freedom (Faccio, 2006, p. 379). In 
countries with more press freedom, journalists are better protected and media independence is 
better guaranteed. Increased freedom of press and related freedom of information positively 
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affects writing about and revelation of companies’ suspected use of earnings management 
strategies. We therefore argue that freedom of press is a good proxy for the degree of scrutiny 
by the media and for transparency, which strengthen the public monitoring ability and the 
likelihood of earnings management detection. To determine to what extent the effects of 
having (or not having) political connections differs between countries that have higher or 
lower levels of public monitoring, we included interactions between the variables CONNECT 
and PRESS_FREEDOM in the analyses.  
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
In the multilevel data analyses, we included several control variables and random effects at the 
firm level. In addition, we included industry and year dummies to control for time and sector 
specific effects. Finally, we added several specific control variables at the country level, 
together with country random or fixed effects (Dong and Stettler, 2012). Consistent with prior 
literature, we included as firm control variables Leverage (LEVERAGE), Market–to–book 
ratio (MARKET-TO-BOOK) and the natural log of Return on assets (LNROA) (Cohen et al., 
2008; Chaney et al., 2011; Zang, 2012). Leverage was defined as total debt as percentage of 
total assets, and Market–to–book as the ratio of market capitalization divided by the book 
value of common equity. At industry level we controlled for industry differences. Based on a 
categorization of industries on the basis of two digit SIC codes (Campbell, 1996; Cohen et al., 
2008), our sample is composed of publicly traded firms operating in 27 different industries. 
However, because we had less than 30 observations in 4 industries, we reclassified our sample 
in six main industry groups: mining (10-17), manufacturing (20-39), transportation and public 
utilities (40-49), trade (50-59), finance, insurance & real estate (60-67), and services (70-89).  
At the country level, we included three control variables that have been found to be 
associated with earnings management. Consistent with Faccio (2006 and 2010), we computed 
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measures for corruption, gross domestic product per capita and inflation. The variable 
corruption (CORRUPTION) was included because countries that have higher levels of 
corruption may have weaker legal enforcement and investor protection rights, which increases 
a firm’s opportunities to manage earnings and decreases the likelihood of detection and the 
likelihood that outsiders will take disciplinary actions against the firm (La Porta et al., 1998 
and 2000; Leuz et al., 2003).
6
 As a proxy of corruption, we used the average of three indexes 
used by Faccio (2010) as measures of perceived corruption: the Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton index (Kaufmann et al., 1999a and b); the International Country Risk index (Faccio, 
2006 and 2010); and the German corruption index (Neumann, 1994). The corruption indexes 
were (re)scaled from 0 to 10, so that higher scores represent higher levels of corruption, i.e., 
“the abuse of public office for private gains” (Faccio, 2010).  
Cross domestic product per capita (GDP/CAP) is an indicator of a country's economic 
development. A country’s wealth potentially influences the level of legal enforcement (La 
Porta et al., 2000; Leuz et al., 2003). Consistent with Chaney et al. (2011), GDP/CAP was 
measured as the natural log of the changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per Capita (CAP) 
(International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database (2009)). The variable 
inflation (INFLATION) was measured by the logarithm of a country’s average percentage of 
change in consumer prices (Leuz et al., 2003). INFLATION is included because cross-country 
variation in inflation may affect the earnings management measures, and thus the variability in 
earnings management. In addition, INFLATION is a proxy for the business cycle that indicates 
the fluctuation in economic activity and obviously affects a firm’s activity (Chaney et al., 
2011).  
                                                          
6
 In the robustness section, we also use corruption as a proxy for public monitoring since a country’s 
higher (lower) level of institutional quality may result in a higher (lower) level of public monitoring. 
The results of the additional sensitivity tests show that the different measures of public monitoring have 
qualitatively similar effects to the choices for earnings management strategies of firms with and 
without political connections. 
18 
 
Finally, consistent with Zang (2012), we winsorized all continuous control variables at 
the 1% and 99% percentile of their distribution to prevent that our results were driven by 
extreme outliers. Moreover, in all regressions, we adjusted the standard errors for possible 
heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Table 2 summarizes the definitions of the dependent, independent and control variables 
employed in our analyses. Table 3 reports summary statistics for these variables. The mean 
values of our proxies for discretionary accruals and real earnings management are consistent 
with previous studies (Cohen et al., 2008). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the Pearson pairwise correlations between all variables in the 
main tests. As expected, the correlations between the proxies of real earnings management and 
accrual-based earnings management were significantly negative. Consistent with prior studies 
(Cohen, 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012), these findings indicate that firms 
appear to use real and accrual-based earnings management as substitutes in managing earnings. 
Further, the significant correlations among the proxies for real earnings management suggest 
that firms can choose between several methods of real earnings management. The correlations 
between the proxies for real earnings management and our comprehensive real earnings 
management proxy indicate that they overall are based on the same underlying construct. 
Political connectedness is significantly and positively correlated with real earnings 
management, but negatively correlated with accrual-based earnings management, indicating 
that connected firms use more real and less accrual-based earnings management than non-
connected firms.  
 
3.3 Method 
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Because we have repeated measurements at firm level that are nested within countries, we 
used multilevel (panel) data regression analyses to test our hypotheses. Multilevel analysis is 
an appropriate method to include explanatory variables at different levels simultaneously, i.e., 
at country and firm level, and to study interactions among these levels (Hox, 2002; Dong and 
Stettler, 2012). Moreover, for nested data, as in our present study, the traditional assumptions 
of (single-level) regressions, like independence of explanatory variables and uncorrelated error 
terms, may not always hold. That is, since companies in the same country share similar 
national environments and institutions, the “firm-level determinants are likely to be correlated 
with country-level variables” (Dong and Stettler, 2012: 272).  
To test our hypotheses, we used the following general multilevel regression model: 
REM = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐸𝑀 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀 +  𝛽4𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇 × 𝐴𝐸𝑀 
+ 𝛽5𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀 × 𝐴𝐸𝑀 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇 × 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀 
+ 𝛽7𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇 × 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀 × 𝐴𝐸𝑀 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿
+ 𝛽9𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽11𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 + 𝜀   (1) 
Where, the response variable REM is a proxy for real earnings management. The dependent 
and independent variables of Equation (1) were explained in the previous section and in Table 
2.  
To address the fact that the relationship between real and accrual-based earnings (AM) 
management may differ depending on the existence of political connections and a country’s 
level of public monitoring, we included the interactions between the variable AM and the 
variables CONNECT and PRESS FREEDOM. To compute the interaction terms, for our 
measures of accrual-based earnings we used centered versions of the variables involved. The 
main effect can be interpreted as the average effect. In addition, we controlled for firm and 
country random effects, and include fixed effects at industry and year level.  
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Equation (1) is able to test whether substitution of real earnings management for 
accruals-based earning management generally takes place, but it is difficult to infer at which 
level the substitution takes place. Therefore, as a robustness check, we also analyzed whether 
politically-connected firms (i) are more likely to use combinations of high levels of real and 
low levels of accrual-based earnings management strategies and (ii) are less likely to use 
combinations of low levels of real and high levels of accrual-based earnings management 
strategies than non-connected firms. For this, we define another econometric specification 
which estimates a firm’s likelihood for using one of the two diametrically opposing 
combinations of high and low levels of real and accrual-based and real earnings management 
strategies (with RMHigh&AMLow or RMHigh&AMLow as dependent variable): 
RMHigh&AMLowor RMLow&AMHigh
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇
× 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽7𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 + 𝜀   (2) 
With the exception of the dependent variable(s) and the corresponding exclusion of 
AM as explanatory variable (now part of the dependent variable), Equation (2) is identical to 
Equation (1). As estimation method we used a multilevel logistic or logistic regression for 
Equation (2) (Dong and Stettler, 2012). 
 
4. Results 
Table 4 reports the results of the regression analyses for the hypothesized relationships 
between accrual-based earnings management, political connections, the level of public 
monitoring and the combinations of accrual-based earnings management, political connections 
and public monitoring, and real earnings management. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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Panel A of Table 4 reports negative and significant associations between accrual-based 
earnings management and real earnings management when real earnings management was 
measured using the three comprehensive metrics of real activities manipulation, after having 
controlled for variations in companies' real earnings management related to the other factors 
specified in the model. Panel B shows significantly negative association between accrual-
based earnings management and real earnings management when real earnings management 
was measured using the individual proxies for real earnings management. Consistent with 
prior literature (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012), these findings 
indicate that companies are likely to substitute real earnings management for accrual-based 
earnings management.  
Table 4 also shows interaction effects of accrual-based earnings management with 
CONNECT and PRESS FREEDOM. The results in Panel A show statistically significant and 
negative relationships between the interactions of accrual-based earnings management and 
political connectedness using the aggregate real earnings management measures RM_CD and 
RM_CPD. The magnitude of the coefficients is also economically significant: compared with 
non-connected firms, one standard deviation increase in accrual-based earnings management is 
associated, on average, with a decrease in connected firms’ RM_CD and RM_CPD of  0.17 
and 0.28 standard deviations, respectively. The interaction with RM_PD was negative but not 
significant. Panel B shows a significant and negative association for the interactions between 
accrual-based earnings management and political connectedness when real earnings 
management was measured using RM_CFO and RM_DISX, while the relationship with 
RM_PROD was negative but not significant. The magnitude of the coefficients also indicates 
economic significance. Consistent with our expectation, these findings suggest that firms with 
political connections are more inclined to substitute the relatively costly real earnings 
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management strategies for accrual-based earnings management strategies than non-connected 
firms. Overall, we find that the results in Table 4 provide support for H1. 
Table 5 reports the results of the multilevel logistic and logistic regressions using the 
combinations of high and low real and accrual-based earnings management strategies as 
dependent variables (see Equation 2).  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The findings in the Models 1-2 of Table 5 show statistically significantly positive 
coefficients for CONNECT. These coefficients reflect the log of the odds ratio between having 
or not having political connections, controlling for the other factors specified in the models. 
The odds ratio indicates the change in odds that connected firms use combinations of relatively 
high levels of real and low levels of accrual-based earnings management strategies than non-
connected firms, everything else held constant. The magnitude of the coefficients indicates 
economic significance. In model 1, for instance, the ratio of the odds for connected firms to the 
odds for non-connected firms of using the combination is exp(0.387) = 1.47 indicating that the 
probability that firms use a combination of high levels of real and low levels of accrual-based 
earnings management strategies divided by the probability that the firm does not use this 
combination is about 1.5 times higher for connected firms than for non-connected firms. The 
statistically and economically significant results in the Models 1-2 of Table 5 indicate that 
politically-connected firms are more likely to use combinations of relatively high levels of real 
earnings management and low levels of accrual-based earnings management than non-
connected firms, everything else held constant. Moreover, the Models 3-4 show that 
politically-connected firms are significantly less likely to use combinations of relatively low 
real earnings management and high accrual-based earnings management strategies, after 
controlling for other differences in earnings management incentives. Together, these results 
provide additional support for H1. They indicate that firms with political connection have 
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more incentives to manage their earnings secretly than non-connected firms. These results are 
in line with previous studies related to political connections (Faccio, 2010). Collectively, our 
findings in Table 4 and 5 provide strong support H1. They indicate that, compared to non-
connected firms, politically-connected firms are more likely to substitute relatively more 
costly and less detectable real earnings management strategies for accrual-based earnings 
management strategies. 
Tables 4 also reports interaction effects of CONNECT with PRESS FREEDOM to test 
H2 which states that public monitoring has an additional effect on politically-connected firms’ 
choices to substitute real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management. 
Models 2 and 4 in Panel A and Models 2 and 4 in Panel B show that the interactions between 
press freedom and accrual-based earnings management were statistically significantly and 
negatively associated with the use of real earnings management strategies. These findings 
indicate that when public monitoring increases, companies are more likely to substitute real 
earnings management strategies for accrual-based earnings management strategies. Panels A 
and B of Table 4 also reveal negative associations between real earnings management and the 
tree-way interaction between political connectedness, press freedom and accrual-based 
earnings management. The associations with the scores on the measures RM_CPD and 
RM_CFO were also partially significant. The results of the three-way interaction indicate that 
politically-connected firms in countries with higher levels of press freedom have a higher 
substitution rate of real earnings management for accrual-based earnings than politically-
connected firms that are domiciled in countries with lower levels of public scrutiny. Further 
evidence that press freedom is positively related to higher rates of real earnings management 
and, simultaneously, to lower rates of accrual-based management by politically-connected 
firms is shown in Model 2 in Table 5, which reports a positive interaction effect between 
CONNECT and PRESS FREEDOM on RMHigh&AMLow. The respective interaction effect in 
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the more constrained Model 1 in Table 5 is also positive but not significant. Moreover, as 
expected in H2, we also find that press freedom is negatively related to lower rates of real 
earnings management and, simultaneously, to higher rates of accrual-based management by 
politically-connected firms although the coefficients are not statistically significant. Overall, a 
number of models in Table 4 and 5 show that companies with political connections are more 
likely to substitute real earnings management strategies for accrual-based earnings 
management strategies when public monitoring increases. Although some of the effects are not 
statistically significant, all coefficients are as expected and none of the estimated models 
shows a statistically significant opposite effect. Hence, we can conclude that our results 
provide strong partial support for H2. 
 
5. Robustness
7
 
Panel A of Table 1 shows that the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom are relatively 
well represented in our data set with respectively 2786 (51%), 1074 (20%) and 710 (13%) 
observations. To check that our results may not be influenced by the inclusion (or exclusion) 
of one of these countries, we recursively repeated our main analyses after eliminating these 
three countries, one at a time, from the analysis. In addition, we repeated our main analyses 
after eliminating the countries with five or less than five firm-year observations. The findings 
of these additional analyses (unreported) are consistent with the main results in the Tables 4-5, 
indicating that the results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of countries. Given the 
skewed distribution by country, we also repeated our main regression analyses including 
sampling weights. That is, we checked our regressions with inverted probability weights as in, 
e.g., Weitzel and Berns (2006). For example, each observation from the US was weighted with 
1/0.5072, where 0.5072 is the proportion of US observations in the total sample (Panel A of 
Table 1). This means that each country and all country-specific characteristics enter the 
                                                          
7 All results from the robustness checks are available from the authors on request. 
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estimation with the same weight, effectively eliminating concerns that our results are driven by 
some large outlier countries. The findings of these additional analyses (unreported) show that 
our results are robust with regard to the different frequencies of country observations. 
To assess firm-level use of real and accrual-based earnings management, we 
constructed dummy variables using the industry-year median as cut-off point (Cohen et al., 
2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). To check whether our results are robust to alternative cut-
off points, we repeated our analyses using the top 25% and 10% of the sample. Our results 
show that segmentation of firms with and without earnings management at different levels do 
not change our results qualitatively suggesting that the results are robust to different cut-off 
levels. To check whether our results are sensitive to alternative measures of earnings 
management, we considered alternative measures of accrual-based earnings management. For 
this reason, we repeated our analysis by using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995; 
Dechow et al, 2010). In addition, since discretionary accrual models, like the modified Jones’ 
model, have been criticized to estimate discretionary accruals with error (e.g. McNichols, 2000; 
Collins and Hribrar, 2002), we also used total accruals instead of discretionary accruals. Our 
results using these alternative measures are consistent with those reported in the paper.  
Our results show that, compared to non-connected firms, politically-connected firms 
are more likely to substitute real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management 
strategies. Additionally, we also examined whether politically-connected firms are more likely 
to use real earnings management strategies than non-connected firms. For this reason, we used 
our aggregate and individual measures of real earnings management as dependent variables. 
The findings of the additional analyses (unreported) indicate that politically-connected firms 
are more engaged in the relatively costly but less detectable real activities manipulation than 
non-connected firms. Hence, politically-connected firms do not only favor real earnings 
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management as a substitute for accrual based strategies, but also generally use the former more 
than non-connected firms. 
We also checked whether our results are robust to alternative measures of public 
monitoring. For this reason, we used corruption as a proxy for public monitoring since a 
country’s higher (lower) level of institutional quality may result in a higher (lower) level of 
public monitoring. The findings of the additional analyses (unreported) show that results are 
qualitatively robust to the different measures of public monitoring. We also used individual 
corruption measures instead of the composite average corruption measure to test our 
hypotheses. The findings of these additional analyses (unreported) show that results are robust 
to different measures of corruption. Overall, as none of the robustness tests change our general 
results, we are confident that our findings are qualitatively robust. 
 
6. Conclusion and discussion 
This study examined whether politically-connected firms are more likely to substitute real 
earnings management for accrual-based earnings management than non-connected firms. We 
argue that politically-connected firms favor the relatively more costly real earnings 
management strategies because of its higher secrecy. Particularly when public monitoring and 
the risk of detection increase, they have more incentives to substitute real earnings 
management for accrual-based earnings management strategies to manage and mask the gains 
that they typically derive from their connections, especially those of dubious legality (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1990; Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006; Chaney et al., 2011). Consistent with 
our expectations, the results of several multilevel regression analyses show that political 
connections play a significant role in explaining variance in firm’s choices of earnings 
management strategies. Compared to non-connected firms, politically-connected firms are 
more likely to substitute relatively more costly and less detectable real earnings management 
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strategies for accrual-based earnings management strategies. Moreover, politically-connected 
firms domiciled in countries that have a higher (lower) level of public monitoring are more 
(less) likely to substitute real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management. 
Additional results also indicate that politically-connected firms generally engage more in real 
activities manipulation than non-connected firms. 
These results have several important implications for accounting practices and research 
related to earnings management. First, the findings are likely to be helpful for external capital 
providers and other stakeholders in assessing the pervasiveness of earnings management and 
the overall integrity of financial reporting of the connected firms. Second, the finding that 
politically-connected firms treat real and accrual-based management strategies as substitutes 
has important implications for research. In research settings where both accrual-based and real 
earnings management strategies are likely to be used to achieve earnings targets, variation in 
earnings management cannot be fully captured by studying accrual-based earnings 
management only (Kothari et al., 2012; Zang, 2012). If firms use both earnings management 
strategies as substitutes, studying only the former would underestimate the earnings 
management activities of politically-connected firms. Third, our findings have political 
implications. Standard setters can consider ways to refine existing governance systems and 
accounting standards and expand disclosure requirements to enhance quality of financial 
reporting, in particular for real earnings management and for firms in which earnings 
management is common. Consistent with Zang (2012), our findings imply that for connected 
firms enhancing scrutiny and/or increasing constraints over accounting discretion do not 
eliminate earnings management activities altogether, but only change managers’ preference for 
different earnings management strategies. They indicate that stronger monitoring and legal 
enforcement might reduce firms’ opportunities for accrual-based earnings management, but at 
the same time are likely to increase the levels of real activities manipulation engaged by 
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connected firms. In the end this might be even more costly for investors. This raises the 
question to what extent institutional changes in governance and accounting, i.e., higher levels 
of public monitoring and governance and increasing constraints over accounting discretion 
regarding the different forms of earnings management, positively or negatively affect the 
efficient allocation of resources. This may be an interesting avenue for further research. 
Of course, this study has its limitations. Two of these limitations are related to the use 
of our measures of political connectedness and earnings management. Regarding the former, 
we examine variation in earnings management strategies given the existence of political 
connections. The underlying assumption in the empirical part is that political connections are 
uniformly associated with choices for accrual-based and real earnings management strategies. 
However, the benefits from political connections should be expected to differ for a member of 
parliament of the opposition party to a member of parliament of the governing party to a 
minister in government. Consequently, different types of political connections may have 
different effects on firms’ choices of earnings management strategies. Additionally, we only 
consider one aspect of earnings manipulation, i.e. the level of accrual-based and real earnings 
management. However, we do not examine the relationship between political connectedness 
and other aspects of earnings management, such as timeliness, value relevance and earnings 
conservatism (Dechow et al., 2010). In addition, the earnings management literature indicates 
disagreements concerning the validity of these models, i.e., the models might be mis-specified 
due to correlated omitted variables and lack to isolate discretionary accruals and real activities 
manipulation (Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow et al., 2012). These limitations limit the 
generalizability of our findings. Another limitation was the use of a sample with firms from 30 
countries for the period 1997–2001. The data showed that the percentage of politically-
connected firms varied considerable between the countries suggesting a risk of sample bias, 
which limit the generalizability of our findings. In addition, changes in governance and 
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accounting from 2002, like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the United States (Cohen at al., 
2008) may moderate firms’ choices for earnings management strategies. Despite these 
institutional changes, politically-connected firms are still more likely to substitute less 
detectable real earnings management strategies for accrual-based earnings management 
strategies since they have more incentives to manage their earnings secretly and mask their 
political favors.  
Further research could make a distinction between different types of political 
connections to examine the associations between types of political connections and 
applications of different earnings management strategies, and use more current data. Finally, 
we acknowledge that the interaction between political connectedness and press freedom is 
only one of several methods to test the additional effect of public monitoring on firms’ choices 
for earnings management strategies. Future research could advance this approach with other 
moderator effects that potentially influence and condition the choices for different earnings 
management strategies. Overall, more research is needed for an improved understanding of the 
connections between firms and politicians in different national and international contexts as 
this would help to identify critical factors that affect the choices of firms and their managers 
for different earnings management strategies.  
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for sample firms (1997-2001) 
 Panel A. Country distribution of firms with and without political connections and (mean) country 
characteristics (1997-2001) 
Country No. of firms with available data CORRUP-
TION
 2
 
GDP/CAP
2 
 INFLA-
TION
 2
 
 
Political 
connections
1
 
Total (%) 
   
 
No Yes 
  
Mean Mean Mean 
AUSTRALIA 34 1 35 (0.64) 1.798 2,6816.43 3.008 
BELGIUM 2 5 7 (0.13) 3.657 25,338.51 1.920 
CANADA 75 7 82 (1.49) 0.889 26,730.81 1.735 
CHILE 6 1 7 (0.13) 2.942 9,010.52 4.823 
DENMARK 2 7 9 (0.16) 0.742 26,481.83 2.285 
FINLAND 4 2 6 (0.11) 0.831 22,218.28 1.797 
FRANCE 16 19 35 (0.64) 2.435 24,261.58 1.295 
GERMANY 19 12 31 (0.56) 1.759 25,040.50 1.344 
HONGKONG 24 7 31 (0.56) 2.373 25,492.48 -1.177 
HUNGARY 1 1 2 (0.04) 3.772 11,443.40 11.150 
INDIA 5 8 13 (0.24) 5.612 1,346.24 6.087 
INDONESIA 33 29 62 (1.13) 6.598 2,414.16 19.627 
ISRAEL 2 2 4 (0.07) 2.447 19,418.98 4.635 
ITALY 9 20 29 (0.53) 3.395 22,861.19 2.501 
JAPAN 1,041 33 1,074 (19.55) 3.553 25,179.41 -0.494 
MALAYSIA 149 5 154 (2.80) 3.733 8,684.34 2.496 
MEXICO 58 67 125 (2.28) 5.554 9,955.65 12.983 
NETHERLANDS 12 6 18 (0.33) 0.947 27,114.91 2.527 
PHILIPPINES 1 1 2 (0.04) 5.456 2,220.63 90.901 
RUSSIA 7 4 11 (0.20) 6.233 7,018.97 31.374 
SINGAPORE 1 4 5 (0.09) 1.105 30,527.43 0.723 
SOUTHKOREA 38 14 52 (0.95) 4.682 15,301.34 3.535 
SPAIN 1 3 4 (0.07) 2.571 20,525.54 2.634 
SWEDEN 11 3 14 (0.25) 0.829 24,500.51 1.566 
SWITZERLAND 26 6 32 (0.58) 0.857 29,551.53 0.815 
TAIWAN 60 8 68 (1.24) 3.749 18,540.47 0.410 
THAILAND 47 36 83 (1.51) 5.330 4,865.35 3.778 
TURKEY 1 1 2 (0.04) 5.698 7,757.52 71.090 
UNITED KINGDOM 575 135 710 (12.93) 1.587 23,968.61 1.451 
UNITED STATES 2,776 10 2,786 (50.72) 2.186 32,793.61 2.389 
 Total 5,036 457 5,493 (100.00)    
1
 A company is defined as politically connected if “at least one of its large shareholders (anyone 
controlling at least 10% of the voting shares) or one of its top officers (CEO, president, vice-president, 
chairman, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister or the head of state, or is closely related to a 
top politician or party” (Faccio, 2006: 370 and 2010:907). 
2
 See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
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Table 1 Panel B. Country distribution of firms with and without political connections per year (1997-2001) 
 
Year 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Country 
No. of firms with available 
data 
No. of firms with available 
data 
No. of firms with 
available data 
No. of firms with 
available data 
No. of firms with 
available data 
 
Political 
connections 
Tot. Political 
connections 
Tot. Political 
connections 
Tot. Political 
connections 
Tot. Political 
connections 
Tot. 
 
No Yes 
 
No Yes 
 
No Yes 
 
No Yes 
 
No Yes 
 AUSTRALIA 2 1 3 2 1 3 3 1 4 5 1 6 30 1 31 
BELGIUM 0 3 3 0 3 3 1 3 4 2 3 5 2 4 6 
CANADA 26 5 31 26 5 31 30 3 33 32 3 35 41 2 43 
CHILE 2 1 3 2 1 3 1 1 2 4 1 5 0 1 1 
DENMARK 0 7 7 0 7 7 0 6 6 0 5 5 2 5 7 
FINLAND 2 2 4 2 2 4 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
FRANCE 6 18 24 6 18 24 8 16 24 10 15 25 11 15 26 
GERMANY 2 11 13 2 11 13 1 11 12 9 9 18 11 7 18 
HONGKONG 0 7 7 0 7 7 1 6 7 12 6 18 20 5 25 
HUNGARY 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 
INDIA 0 8 8 0 8 8 2 8 10 4 8 12 1 8 9 
INDONESIA 15 29 44 15 29 44 10 27 37 22 27 49 16 26 42 
ISRAEL 1 2 3 1 2 3 0 2 2 1 2 3 0 2 2 
ITALY 5 19 24 5 19 24 5 15 20 6 11 17 5 11 16 
JAPAN 141 33 174 141 33 174 74 32 106 919 31 950 999 31 103 
MALAYSIA 0 65 65 0 65 65 1 65 66 33 66 99 36 64 100 
MEXICO 1 6 7 1 6 7 2 6 8 8 5 13 6 6 12 
NETHERLANDS 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
PHILIPPINES 3 4 7 3 4 7 2 4 6 2 4 6 3 4 7 
RUSSIA 0 3 3 0 3 3 0 3 3 0 3 3 1 3 4 
SINGAPORE 0 14 14 0 14 14 2 14 16 24 13 37 31 13 44 
SOUTH KOREA 57 5 62 57 5 62 94 5 99 104 5 109 94 5 99 
SPAIN 0 3 3 0 3 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
SWEDEN 7 3 10 7 3 10 10 3 13 9 2 11 9 2 11 
SWITZERLAND 13 5 18 13 5 18 20 5 25 20 5 25 20 5 25 
TAIWAN 21 7 28 21 7 28 21 8 29 21 8 29 53 7 60 
THAILAND 31 33 64 31 33 64 17 28 45 11 27 38 11 27 38 
TURKEY 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 285 130 415 285 130 415 290 121 411 342 108 450 367 101 468 
UNITEDSTATES 1,264 9 1,273 1,264 9 1,273 1,762 10 1772 1,801 10 1811 177 8 1,778 
Total 1,884 436 2,320 2,239 427 2,666 2,360 409 2769 3,405 384 3789 3,543 368 3,911 
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       Table 1 Panel C. Firm characteristics 
Industry (U.S. SIC codes)1  No. of firms No. of firms with 
political connections 
Total assets Market-to Book 
 
n (%) n (%) Mean 
(Std dev) 
 
Median. Mean Median 
Mining and construction (10-17) 932 (5.28) 133 (5.42) 7,122,590 4,158, 561 5.770 1.657 
Manufacturing (20-39) 9,767 (55.29) 873 (35.55) 1,842,494 2,111,772 3.117 0.965 
Transportation & pub. utilities (40-49) 578 (3.27) 304 (12.38) 2,988,840 1,500,568 1.208 0.593 
Trade (50-59) 186 (1.05) 110 (4.48) 2,019,406 916,121 1.246 0.628 
Finance, insurance, & real estate (60-
67) 
705 (3.99) 612 (24.92) 3.14e+07 1,436,680 0.740 0.522 
Services (70-89) 5,496 (31.11) 424 (17.26) 1,317,008 988,828 9.875 1.424 
Total 17,664 (100.00) 2,456 (100.00) 3,167,834 1,604,421 4.184 0,916 
1
 Our sample is composed of publicly traded firms operating in 27 different industries. Because we had less than 30 observations in 4 industries 
and for presentation purposes, we present our sample in six main industry groups. 
 
Table 1 Panel D. Firms across year and industry 
Year Industry 
Mining and 
construction 
Manufacturing Transportation & Pub. 
utilities 
Trade Finance, insurance 
& real estate 
Services Total 
1996 111 1,211 89 25 121 652 2,209 
1997 118 1,253 86 27 121 715 2,320 
1998 148 1,409 88 25 121 875 2,666 
1999 124 1,434 88 20 110 993 2,769 
2000 196 2,178 112 43 112 1,148 3,789 
2001 235 2,282 115 46 120 1,113 3,911 
Total 932 9,767 578 186 705 5,496 17,664 
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Table 2. Variable Definitions  
Variable name Definition 
RM_CFO (R) = The reversed level of abnormal cash flows from operations (Roychowdhury, 
2006). 
RM_PROD= The level of abnormal production costs, where production costs are defined as 
the sum of the cost of goods sold and the change in inventories (Roychowdhury, 
2006).  
RM_DISX (R)
 
= The reversed level of abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary 
expenses are the sum of R&D expenses and SG&A expenses (Roychowdhury, 
2006). 
RM_CD Comprehensive metrics of real activities manipulation, computed as the sum of 
the standardized variables of RM_CFO and RM_DISX multiplied by negative 
one (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
RM_PD Comprehensive metrics of real activities manipulation, computed as the sum of 
the standardized variable of RM_PROD and the standardized variable of 
RM_DISX multiplied by negative one (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). 
RM_CPD Comprehensive metrics of real activities manipulation, computed as the sum of 
the standardized variable of RM_PROD and the standardized variables of 
RM_CFO and RM_DISX multiplied by negative one (Cohen at al., 2008).  
DA = Discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et 
al., 1995; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
REDCA = Performance-adjusted measure of discretionary current accruals, computed as 
the absolute difference between the total current accruals and the expected 
performance (i.e., ROA) adjusted total current accruals (Chaney et al., 2011; 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003). 
AM Composite metric of accrual-based earnings management, computed as the sum 
of the standardized variables of DA and REDCA, divided by two. 
RM_DUMMY =  An aggregated dummy variable of real earnings management that is equal to one 
if one of the individual real earnings management measures is above the 
industry-year median, and 0 otherwise (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
AM_DUMMY =  A dummy variable that is equal to one if firm’s accrual-based earnings 
management measures, i.e., DA or REDCA, were above industry-year median, 
and zero otherwise (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
RMHigh&AMLow= A dummy variable that is equal to one if RM_ DUMMY is one and ACC_ 
DUMMY is zero, and zero otherwise. 
RMLow&AMHigh= A dummy variable that is equal to one if ACC_ DUMMY is one and RM_ 
DUMMY is zero, and zero otherwise. 
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CONNECT = A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is politically connected and 
a value of zero otherwise (Faccio, 2006 and 2010). 
PRESS_FREEDOM = A proxy for a country’s level of public monitoring based on the press freedom 
index used by Faccio (2006). This transparency variable assesses the extent of 
freedom that journalists and the media have in each country and the efforts made 
by government to ensure this freedom (Faccio, 2006, p. 379).  
LEVERAGE Long-term debt divided by total assets (Chaney et al., 2011). 
MARKET_TO_BOOK The market capitalization to common equity, where common equity represents 
common shareholders' investment in a company  
(Cohen And Zarowin, 2010; Chaney et al., 2011). 
LNROA Logarith of Return on Assests (ROA) (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012) 
CORRUPTION = Average of three corruption indexes (Faccio, 2006): the Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton index (Kaufmann et al., 1999a and 1999b); the International 
Country Risk index (Faccio, 2006 and 2010); and the German corruption index 
(Neumann, 1994).  
GDP/CAP = The logarithm of the changes in gross domestic product per capita (International 
Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database, April 
2009:www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx.) (Chaney 
et al., 2011). 
INFLATION = The logarithm of a country’s average percentage change in consumer prices 
(Leuz et al., 2003). 
(R): Indicates reversed score. 
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Table 3. Summary statistics for the variables in the analysis 
 
Table 3 Panel A . Summary statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
RM_CD 10,044 -0.007 0.158 1.623 -3.621 2.473 
RM_PD 4,940 -0.024 -0.112 1.589 -2.151 1.019 
RM_CPD 4,923 -0.006 -0.068 1.609 -1.545 0.950 
RM_CFO (R) 11,530 0.058 0.073 0.152 -0.223 0.281 
RM_PROD  5,861 -0.008 -0.052 0.358 -8.438 3.915 
RM_DISX (R) 10,071 0.015 -0.115 0.355 -2.944 3.327 
RM_DUMMY 17,664 0.698 1 0.459 0 1 
RMHigh & AMLow 11,076 0.518 1 0.499 0 1 
RMLow & AMHigh 11,076 0.082 0 0.275 0 1 
Independent variables       
AM 11,076 0.026 0 1.441 -3.538 0.903 
DA 11,525 0.217 0.096 2.114 0.000 0.340 
REDCA 11,629 0.065 0 0.165 0.000 1.022 
DA_DUMMY 11,076 0.000 0 0.454 0 1 
CONNECT 17,664 0.139 0 0.196 0 1 
PRESS_FREEDOM 17,664 5.792 4.757 3.288 0.500 37.832 
Firm control variables 
LEVERAGE 17,621 0.381 0.159 10.296 0 1,267.00 
MARKET-TO-BOOK 17,539 5.184 0.916 103.822 0 10,771.00 
LNROA 17,391 1.839 2.015 1.0521 -8.842 5.779 
Country control variables 
CORRUPTION 17,645 0.387 -0.317 0.892 -1.81 4.565 
GDP/CAP 17,645 0.238 0.303 0.911 -5.907 2.851 
INFLATION 17,664 0.639 0.622 0.575 -2.302 4.649 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
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Table 3 Panel B. Pearson correlations     
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. RM_CD 
1.00                 
2. RM_PD 
0.44* 1.00                
3. RM_CPD 
0.65* 0.96* 1.00               
4. RM_CFO (R) 
0.13* -0.39* 0.62* 1.00              
5. RM_PROD 
0.16* 0.86* 0.75* -0.39* 1.00             
6. RM_DISX (R) 
0.77* 0.45* 0.64* -0.09* -0.07* 1.00            
7. AM 
-0.33* -0.15* -0.04* -0.06* -0.01* -0.06* 1.00           
8. DA 
-0.54* -0.26 -0.25 -0.05* -0.03* -0.29 0.82* 1.00          
9. REDCA 
-0.13 -0.03 -0.05 -0.13* -0.02 -0.06* 0.71* 0.63* 1.00         
10. CONNECT 
0.04* 0.03* 0.03* 0.05* 0.03* 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.03 1.00        
11. PRESS_FREEDOM 
0.03 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 0.23 1.00       
12. LEVERAGE 
0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.00 1.00      
13. MARKET-TO-BOOK 
-0.06* -0.02* 0.02* -0.03 -0.01* -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.17* 1.00     
14. LNROA 
0.05* 0.01 0.00 0.11* 0.02 0.02 0.06* 0.01 0.06* 0.17* 0.01 0.19* 0.14* 1.00    
15. CORRUPTION 
0.05* 0.02 0.03* 0.09* -0.04* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.28* -0.08* 0.02 -0.01 -0.17 1.00   
16. GDP/CAP 
-0.05* -0.04 -0.05* -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.03 1.00  
17. INFLATION 
-0.06* -0.07* -0.08* -0.01 -0.05* 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.08 0.13 -0.03 -0.00 0.03 0.29* 0.07* 1.00 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent level.  
(R): Indicates reversed score. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
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Table 4 Panel A. Multilevel linear regression results with RM_CD, RM_PD and RM_CDP as dependent variables  
Dependent variable: RM_ CD  RM_ PD RM_ CDP 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
AM -0.197** 
(-2.81) 
-0.178** 
(-2.27) 
-0.248* 
(-1.91) 
-0.188** 
(-2.09) 
-0.041*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.082*** 
(-2.71) 
CONNECT 0.190** 
(2.26) 
0.175 
(1.38) 
0.135 
(0.69) 
-0.271 
(-0.91) 
0.178 
(0.94) 
0.121 
(0.42) 
PRESS FREEDOM -0.007 
(-1.01) 
-0.008 
(-0.99) 
0.006 
(0.29) 
-0.028 
(-1.05) 
0.002 
(0.14) 
-0.021 
(-0.84) 
CONNECT x AM  -0.174** 
(-2.14) 
 -0.072 
(-0.52) 
 -0.276** 
(-2.39) 
PRESS FREEDOM x AM  -0.003* 
(-1.67) 
 -0.108* 
(-1.87) 
 -0.006 
(-1.35) 
CONNECT x PRESS 
FREEDOM 
 0.012 
(0.20) 
 0.476* 
(1.87) 
 0.034 
(1.42) 
CONNECT x PRESS 
FREEDOM x AM 
 -0.003 
(-0.36) 
 -0.036 
(-1.07) 
 -0.028* 
(-1.88) 
LEVERAGE 0.382*** 
(3.66) 
0.381*** 
(3.65) 
0.400*** 
(3.26) 
0.395*** 
(3.22) 
0.037*** 
(3.88) 
0.396*** 
(3.80) 
MARKET-TO-BOOK -0.003* 
(-1.77) 
-0.003* 
(-1.79) 
-0.041** 
(-2.16) 
-0.040** 
(-2.13) 
-0.037*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.036*** 
(-2.80) 
LNROA 0.040*** 
(4.59) 
0.041*** 
(4.73) 
0112*** 
(5.80) 
0.108*** 
(5.63) 
0.080*** 
(5.08) 
0.0811*** 
(5.10) 
CORRUPTION 0.080** 
(2.15) 
0.083** 
(2.17) 
-0.087 
(-1.07) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.05) 
0.065 
(0.72) 
GDP/CAP 0.012 
(0.44) 
0.010 
(0.37) 
0.114** 
(2.19) 
0.086* 
(1.58) 
0.076* 
(1.51) 
0.055 
(1.06) 
INFLATION -0.031* 
(-2.14) 
-0.031* 
(-2.07) 
-.141*** 
(-4.82) 
-0.145* 
(-4.96) 
-0.128** 
(-2.34) 
-0130* 
(-2.43) 
Industry dummies
1,2
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies
1,2
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Random country effects
1
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Random firm effects
1
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Intercept 0.599*** 
(6.80) 
0.602*** 
(6.60) 
0.277 
(1.31) 
0.468** 
(1.98) 
0.492** 
(2.46) 
0.622*** 
(2.79) 
N 5370 5370 3057 3057 3057 3057 
Wald-2 1026.31*** 1052.73*** 474.487*** 490.62*** 154.25*** 162.96*** 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively (two-tailed; t-values below 
the regression coefficients in parentheses). 
See Table 2 for variable definitions; (R): Indicates reversed score. 
1
 Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year dummies and random country and fixed firm effects are not reported for 
parsimony. 
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Table 4 Panel B. Multilevel linear regression results with RM_CFO (R), RM_PROD and RM_DISX (R) as dependent variables 
Dependent variable: RM_CFO (R) RM_PROD RM_DISX (R) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
AM  -0.024** 
(2.11) 
-0.040** 
(-2.40) 
-0.080** 
(2.17) 
-0.0730** 
(-2.85) 
-0.024** 
(-3.80) 
-0.024*** 
(-2.75) 
CONNECT 0.002** 
(2.24) 
0.002* 
(1.69) 
0.088* 
(1.83) 
0.053 
(1.29) 
0.003 
(0.81) 
0.004 
(0.84) 
PRESS FREEDOM -0.003 
(-0.36) 
-0.003 
(-0.21) 
-0.005** 
(-2.20) 
-0.001 
(-0.27) 
-0.070 
(-1.48) 
-0.070 
(-0.97) 
CONNECT x AM  -0.038** 
(-2.11) 
 -0.067 
(-1.38) 
 -0.231** 
(-3.21) 
PRESS FREEDOM x AM  -0.002** 
(2.46) 
 -0.004** 
(-2.28) 
 -0.001 
(-0.47) 
CONNECT x PRESS 
FREEDOM  
 0.001 
(0.09) 
 0.005 
(1.23) 
 -0.001 
(-0.09) 
CONNECT x PRESS 
FREEDOM x AM 
 -0.002** 
(-2.78) 
 -0.004 
(-1.42) 
 -0.001 
(-0.13) 
LEVERAGE -0.029*** 
(-3.48) 
-0.030*** 
(-3.56) 
0.086*** 
(2.71) 
-0.093*** 
(-2.95) 
0.229*** 
(2.43) 
0.230*** 
(3.46) 
MARKET-TO-BOOK -0.001*** 
(-4.31) 
-0.001*** 
(-4.31) 
-0.010*** 
(-5.27) 
-0.009** 
(-2.18) 
-0.045*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.004*** 
(-3.06) 
LNROA 0.009*** 
(3.21) 
0.001*** 
(3.31) 
0.175*** 
(3.35) 
0.014*** 
(2.90) 
0.009 
(1.31) 
0.010 
(1.41) 
CORRUPTION 0.007 
(1.40) 
0.007 
(1.32) 
-0.014 
(1.18) 
-0.004 
(-0.33) 
-0.007** 
(-2.21) 
-0.005** 
(-2.26) 
GDP/CAP 0.059 
(1.41) 
0.006 
(1.44) 
0.004 
(0.45) 
0.035 
(0.33) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
0.002 
(0.18) 
INFLATION 0.001 
(0.36) 
0.001 
(0.71) 
-0.028 
(-0.24) 
-0.023 
(-0.57) 
0.029** 
(2.22) 
0.029** 
(2.19) 
Industry dummies
1
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies
1
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Random country effects
1
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Random firm effects
1
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Intercept 0.071*** 
(4.85) 
0.069*** 
(4.39) 
0.033*** 
(0.73) 
0.073 
(1.14) 
-0.363*** 
(-6.89) 
-0.367*** 
(-6.76) 
N 6120 6120 3609 3609 5370 5370 
Wald-2 925.08*** 987.61*** 562.16*** 708.79*** 1577.98*** 1621.31*** 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively (two-tailed; t-values below 
the regression coefficients in parentheses). 
See Table 2 for variable definitions; (R): Indicates reversed score. 
1
 Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year dummies and random country and fixed firm effects are not reported for 
parsimony. 
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Table 5 Multilevel logistic and logistic regression results of combinations of high and low levels of real and accrual-
based and real earnings management strategies 
 RMHigh & AMLow RMLow & AMHigh 
 Multilevel 
logistic regression 
Logistic regression Multilevel 
logistic regression 
Logistic regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CONNECT 0.387* 0.702** -1.132** -1.367*** 
  (2.33) (5.86) (-2.17) (-2.82) 
PRESS FREEDOM  -0.006  0.138 
 (-0.87)  (0.34) 
CONNECT x PRESS FREEDOM 0.129 0.145** -0.039 -0.002 
(1.35) (2.44) (-1.12) (-0.01) 
LEVERAGE -0.123** 
(-2.23) 
-0.054 
(-1.47) 
0.010 
(0.51) 
0.002 
(0.14) 
MARKET-TO-BOOK -0.038** 
(-2.10) 
-0.052*** 
(3.54) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.001 
(1.06) 
LNROA -0.001 
(-2.32) 
-0.002* 
(-1.84) 
0.000 
(0.52) 
0.000 
(0.15) 
CORRUPTION  0.149***  0.462* 
   (2.89)  (2.42) 
GDP/CAP  -0.102**  0.404*** 
   (-2.45)  (3.05) 
INFLATION  0.220***  -0.046*** 
   (4.64)  (4.73) 
Industry dummies
1,2
 Y (275.25***) Y (148.30***) Y (149.99***) Y (151.42***) 
Fixed country effects
1,2
 Y (187.71***) N Y (167.71***) N 
Year dummies
1,2
 Y (195.31***) Y (230.00***) Y (55.15***) Y (99.33***) 
Random firm effects
1
 Y Y Y Y 
Intercept -1.290* -0.029 -0.717 -2.028*** 
  (-181) (-0.05) (-0.80) (-4.13) 
N 11028 9830 10526 10665 
Wald-2 844.29*** 436.72*** 322.35*** 639.94*** 
Pseudo R²  0.054  0.054 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively (two-tailed; t-values 
below the regression coefficients in parentheses). 
See Table 2 for variable definitions.  
1
 Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, country dummies, year dummies and random fixed firm effects are not reported 
for parsimony. 
2
 Chi-square and statistical significance of joint variables tests in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX MEASUREMENT OF REAL AND ACCRUAL-BASED EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT 
Measurement of real earnings management 
Following Roychowdhury (2006), we used three proxies for real earnings management: abnormal 
levels of cash flow from operations (RM_CFO), abnormal levels of production costs (RM_PROD) 
and abnormal levels of discretionary expenses (RM_DISX). To calculate the proxies for real 
earnings management, consistent with prior research (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; e.g. Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow et al., 1998), for each metric, first, using regression 
analysis, parameters were estimated which allow calculating the normal levels of cash flows from 
operations, production costs, and discretionary expenses respectively. Second and consistent with 
Roychowdhury (2006), the differences between the actual levels and the estimated normal levels, 
i.e. the residuals, were considered as the abnormal levels of cash flows from operations, 
production costs, and discretionary expenses (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Normal levels of cash flow from operations are expressed as a linear function of sales and 
the change in sales. Following Roychowdhury (2006), we estimated the following cross-sectional 
regression: 
 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛽1 
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                        (1)  
 
where: CFOit = the net cash receipts and disbursements resulting from the operations of firm i in 
year t; ASSETSit-1 = the total assets at the end of year t-1 of the ith firm; SALESit = the net sales 
in year t of the ith firm; ∆SALESit = the change in net sales from year t-1 to t of the ith firm. 
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Abnormal CFO (RM_CFO) was measured as the estimated residual from Equation (1). 
Since price discounts and more lenient credit terms will result in lower cash inflows in the current 
period, lower negative residuals imply unusual low levels of cash flows from operations 
suggesting more sales manipulation to manage reported earnings upward.  
Also following Roychowdhury (2006), the normal level of production costs was estimated 
using the following equation: 
 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                  (2)  
where: PRODit = the costs of goods sold of firm i in year t. 
 
 The abnormal production cost (RM_PROD) is the difference between actual and the 
normal level of production costs and was calculated using the estimated coefficients from 
Equation (2). Overproduction will result in positive residuals in equation (2), i.e. high values of 
RM_PROD. High positive values of RM_PROD indicate real activity manipulation through 
overproduction, resulting in a reduction of cost of goods sold. 
The normal level of discretionary expenses was estimated using the equation (3) 
(Roychowdhury, 2006):  
 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛽1 
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2  
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3  
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                        (3)  
 
where: DISXit = discretionary expenses, computed as the sum of SG&A (selling, general and 
administrative expenses) and R&D (research and development) expenses. S&GA represents 
expenses not directly attributable to the production process but relates to selling, general and 
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administrative functions and it includes advertising expenses. R&D expenses consist of all direct 
and indirect costs related to the creation and development of new processes, techniques, 
applications and products with commercial possibilities.  
The abnormal level of discretionary expenses is (RM_DISX) was measured as the estimated 
residual from Equation (3). Low negative residuals indicate that firms cut amounts of 
discretionary expenses to increase reported earnings. Finally, for interpretation purposes we report 
the reversed scores for the variables RM_CFO and RM_DISX, so that for all three proxies, higher 
residuals correspond with high levels of real activities manipulation. 
 
Measurement of accrual-based earnings management 
Following prior literature, we used two estimations of discretionary accruals to proxy accrual-
based earnings management. First, we estimated discretionary accruals by using the cross-
sectional Jones model (DA) (Dechow et al., 1995; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010), 
as follows:  
 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 𝑡−1
= 𝛫1 
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 𝑡−1
+ 𝛫2 
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖 𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 𝑡−1
+ 𝛫3 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖 𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖 𝑡                            (4)                           
 
where: TAit = the total accruals in year t of the ith firm, measured by the difference between 
income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations and cash flows from operations 
(Collins and Hribrar, 2002); PPEit = the net value of property, plant, and equipment at the end of 
year t-1 of the ith firm.  
Equation (4) was estimated by using all data from all firms matched with year t-1 and two-
digit SIC industry groupings. The parameter estimates from this regression were then used to 
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estimate the residuals from Equation (4) in year t. To remove the problem of extreme outliers in 
some continuous variables, we used Cook’s (1977) distance criterion. We removed influential 
observations from the sample if Cook’s distance statistics exceed 3 and re-estimated (Wilson and 
Wu, 2011).  Consistent with Cohen et al. (2008), the absolute values of the residuals, capturing 
discretionary accruals in year t, serve as the proxy for accrual-based earnings management (DA). 
We use the absolute value because it also captures accruals reversals following earnings 
management.  
Second, following Chaney et al. (2011) we used a measure of current discretionary accruals 
that focuses on discretionary earnings management through working capital accruals (and not on 
long-term accruals such as depreciation). For this reason, we used the performance-adjusted 
measure of discretionary current accruals (REDCA) (Chaney et al., 2011), which is based on the 
method used in Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and controls for firm performance (Kothari et al., 2005). 
We estimated the current discretionary accruals using Equation (5): 
𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡                                                                           (5) 
where TCA = total current accruals (TCA) of firm i in year t, and EPTCA = the expected 
performance-adjusted total current accruals in the year t of the ith firm, where ROA controls for 
the effect of performance on the measured discretionary accruals (Chaney et al., 2011: 61-62). We 
used the absolute difference between the total current accruals and the expected performance-
adjusted total current accruals as our second proxy for accrual-based earnings management 
(REDCA). 
 
